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In her influential book Intention (1958), G. E. M. Anscombe lays out three kinds of cases pertaining to the concept of intention: (1) expression of intention for the future, where intention is the content of the expression (“I am going to move the table.”); (2) intentional action, when someone is intentionally performing an action (“I am moving the table”); and (3) intention with which an action is done (“I am moving the table with the intention of serving dinner on it.”). ¹ To understand the concept of intention is to understand all three kinds of cases. Donald Davidson in his paper Actions, Reasons, and Causes (1963) argues that the primary reason for an action is its cause, the primary reason comprising a pair of a pro attitude or the related belief or both. This essay explores each of the three kinds of cases pertaining to the concept of intention, examines the relationship between intentions and actions, reasons and actions, as well as causes and actions.