Moral obligation can operate without a special law binding sense. In ancient China, notions of moral obligation demanding compliance developed without the influence of Christianity or similar religions. Certain principles advocated by Confucius, e.g., one ought to revere the emperor and one ought to be obedient to one’s parents, permeated the society with a moral force such that violation of any of these principles would provoke universal condemnation. Confucius was not given the status of a divine law giver and not everything he advocated carried the same moral force. Because Confucius was not a divine law giver, what he advocated was not given the sense of law binding requirement even though society demanded compliance with them. As these principles became part of the moral code for the ancient Chinese society, the fact that it was Confucius who advocated them was not an important consideration. In other words, the principles were accepted as part of the moral code without a sovereign authority figure or consideration of who advocated them. Thus, morality in ancient China shows that it is possible for moral obligation to operate without the law binding sense. Similarly, it is possible for “moral ought” to operate without a sense of absolute verdict of guilty or not guilty.
Even Aristotle holds that some things are simply vices – “moral ought nots.” Such vices include passions, such as ill will, shamelessness, or envy, or actions, such as adultery, theft, or murder. He holds that these vices are intrinsically evil in themselves, not just by reason of some excess or defect. The vices are intrinsically evil in that no one could possess the evil passions or perform the evil actions in a proper way, or at a right time, or in due circumstances, however much pleasure the passions or actions would give someone.
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