Conclusion

I accept Anscombe’s superb reasoning in concluding the concept of moral obligation to be incongruous. I also do not have objections to the Aristotelian ethics concerning human virtues. My concern for abandoning the concept of moral obligation or moral responsibility is pragmatic, in that modernity brings about actions by abstract entities such as corporations, and machines with undecipherable algorithms. Actions by abstract entities and machines may not easily be examined under human virtue ethics. Abstract entities and machines should be subject to moral obligations and moral responsibilities. To repair the incongruity in the concept of moral obligation, the special law binding sense should be disposed of. It is not unreasonable to dispose of the special law binding sense in moral obligation while maintaining a coherent concept of moral obligation because (1) other societies such as that of ancient China had notions of moral obligation without the need for a special law binding sense, (2) a moral code born out of human intuition of shared intentionality gives rise to moral obligations without the special law binding sense, and (3) Aristotle’s notions of justice contain elements of moral obligation without the special law binding sense.

As for James Doyle’s assertion that Anscombe goes so far as to declare that moral obligation is only a word and never a concept, even if Anscombe indeed makes such a declaration in Modern Moral Philosophy, I do not find good reasons by Anscombe supporting it. In any case, moral obligation or moral responsibility conjures the idea of ethical demands of one’s conduct and is capable of being a concept. Denying it to ever be a concept lacks reason. Anscombe rightly pointed out the incongruity in the concept of moral obligation, but such incongruity can be repaired by disposing of the special law binding sense arising out of Christianity.