III. Self-Knowledge and Morality

Kant thinks that self-knowledge has a significant role to play in one’s morality. He claims that one can never truly know oneself. ⁷ Under Kant’s metaphysics of transcendental idealism, there is a division between appearances and thing-in-itself. Self-consciousness, the basis for self-knowledge, belongs to human cognition and can only reveal what appears internally to us but never reveal the thing-in-itself of our true self. This is the case despite our privileged access to self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is a form of human cognition and must be structured by certain a priori forms – space, time, and causality. These a priori forms are not extrapolated from the experience of objects but are the very conditions of the possibility for the experience. Kant also claims that one has a first duty to know oneself, ⁸ though not in terms of natural perfection, but in terms of moral perfection in relation to one’s duty. I take it that Kant’s statements about not being able to truly know oneself and about having a duty to know oneself are not contradictory because although one can never truly know oneself, to the extent one can know her own moral perfection in relation to one’s duty, one should have a duty to know oneself. The two considerations of morality I raise do not require self-knowledge as a duty but merely as a possibility. They require the moral agent to exercise agency and be judged morally from the agency.

(1) First Consideration

To discuss the first consideration, “to be moral, a moral agent should extend the coverage of “do-no-harm” and “help others” to everyone and all sentient beings,” we first turn to the metaphysics of existence. The ancient Sanskrit text, the Upanishads, describes the world we live in as one interconnected universe with a single and unifying underlying atman. Each object in existence has a different articulation of the atman, with each articulation being a brahman. Kant’s metaphysics of thing-in-itself and appearance can be said to reflect the reality described in the Upanishads, provided that Kant also believes in one interconnected thing-in-itself for all existence. I embrace the metaphysics of existence reflected in the Upanishads because if each object has its own thing-in-itself, how can we explain the connectedness among objects we observe? Where would the boundaries be? If we take metaphysics of existence reflected in the Upanishads as true, the same metaphysics has to also be true for the metaphysics of ethics. Thus, each moral agent is an articulation of the interconnected world that underlies our existence. The interconnectedness of the world and that of the self and others are reflected upon as a form of self-knowledge because such an idea is a belief. Compassion to all is possible when a moral agent possesses such self-knowledge of interconnectedness. Consequently, due to possessing this self-knowledge, it is possible to extend the coverage of “do-no-harm” and “help others” to everyone and all sentient beings.

As we come to know the sameness with others that we previously consider as being different from us, we become more compassionate. For example, when the novel “Uncle Tom’s Cabin” opened the eyes to the humanity of the negroes, more people became more compassionate towards slaves, which led to the eventual abolition of slavery in America. Similarly, as more people understand the love shared between same-sex partners is no different from the love between heterosexual couples, they come to act more justly and are more compassionate towards same-sex partnership. The interconnectedness of the world awaits moral agents to reflect so that their compassion can be extended to all. It is a form of self-knowledge and not knowledge in general because, without being able to sense or intellectually conceive what the thing-in-itself is like, the self’s interconnectedness with others can only be a belief. A belief is a form of self-knowledge. Upon believing the self’s interconnectedness with others, the seed of compassion takes shape when a moral agent can identify with the object of compassion. The capacity of compassion is further cultivated through experience or imagination. This is not to say that all compassion is achieved through a belief of interconnectedness with others. The intuitive compassion such as that in a young child requires no additional belief. However, genuine learned compassion, from which growth in morality is possible, is arrived at from the belief of interconnectedness with others.

(2) Second Consideration

We now turn to the second important consideration of morality and moral actions: to avoid being immoral, a moral agent should know his roles and moral obligations pertaining to the roles to ensure that those obligations are performed. Many moral theorists treat the acts of moral worth as the focus of ethics. Compassion being in constant competition with the anti-moral dispositions of egoism and malice, the tendency to commit immoral acts is as constant, if not more so, as the tendency to act morally. Therefore, the focus of ethics should be as much about not committing immoral acts as it is about acting morally. Further, a moral agent’s existence is dynamic, changeable through time. As the moral agent moves across space and time, different roles and obligations arise for the moral agent because of dependencies and reasonable expectations from others. The moral agent must dynamically and constantly address the different obligations that are called for by each situation.

In the Epic of Gilgamesh ⁹ , the hero Gilgamesh at first is an oppressed king. Through his effort and struggle to find immortality, he comes to understand his role in the world – a mortal and a king, and he lives out his life being a good king serving his people. A moral agent may live a life taking on many roles, a parent, a teacher, an employee, or a passer-by who is the only one around to help when someone is dying of an injury by the roadside. Each role may impose obligations on the moral agent to do something particular. Inadequately performing these obligations may cause harm to others, and such inadequacy may be immoral. For example, doctors carelessly treat patients causing them serious harm or even death, or parents neglect their children. There is also double evil, i.e., when one is supposed to be in a position of trust to render help, he intentionally harms instead. A moral agent must grow into the various roles and understand the obligations that come with them. In addition to the individual roles that the moral agent has to take on, the moral agent may become part of various groups and take on group agency for a joint endeavor with others and take on obligations by way of the group’s commitment. Group commitments may or may not be of moral worth. To carry out the morally required obligations, the moral agent must possess the desire to perform such actions. Desire, like belief, is a form of self-knowledge.

Thus, the two considerations of morality involve the self-knowledge of belief and desire: a belief for the interconnectedness of the self and the rest of the sentient beings and a desire to perform the obligations from the roles the moral agent takes on. Belief and desire are intentional states and possess two properties: transparency and authority. The property of transparency refers to the intentional states of belief and desire being immediately known by the self, i.e., the first order presence of the intentional states, and the property of authority refers to the intentional states being known, i.e., the second order presence of the intentional state. (Bilgrami 2012) The transparency and authority properties of belief and desire allow the moral agent interactive access to the special kind of self-knowledge important for morality. The dynamic nature of belief and desire is reflected in the dynamic requirement of moral obligations. We thus establish the relationship between self-knowledge and morality to answer the two questions raised in the beginning. The growth of self-knowledge affects morality. A special kind of self-knowledge is a belief of the interconnectedness of self and the rest of the sentient beings. Such a belief expands the moral agent’s compassion to everyone. Another special kind of self-knowledge is a desire to perform moral obligations that arise from a moral agent's various roles. Such a desire allows the moral agent to avoid being immoral by neglecting obligations they ought to perform.